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REWARDING OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
Assaf Hamdani*
Reinier Kraakman**

While they often rely on the threatof penalties to produce deterrence, legal
systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the
use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however
demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with
significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot
implement such a regime in the form of equity compensationfor directors.
We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward
regimes. While this Article focuses on outside directors, the implications of
our analysis extend to other gatekeepers as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The proper role of legal sanctions in motivating directorial oversight is
one of the most difficult issues in corporate governance. On one hand, the
law has long been reluctant to hold directors effectively liable for negligently supervising managers. Indeed, U.S. corporate law goes far to insulate
directors from such liability because, it is said, directors would otherwise
hesitate to serve or would become overly risk averse. On the other hand, the
law has also been reluctant to give directors a free pass for all misconduct
short of intentional wrongdoing-presumably because lawmakers fear that
doing so would leave dangerously little incentive for boards to monitor
management. As might be expected, moreover, the tension between distrusting boards and fearing liability has stimulated awkward doctrine and a
considerable literature about the costs and benefits of liability in the complex setting of the boardroom.' This Article adds to that literature obliquely.
We do not attempt to assess the optimal level of liability in the boardroom.
Instead, we look beyond the traditional debate over the desirable scope of
liability to explore a logical alternative: namely, the possibility of employing
rewards to motivate directors.
The law conventionally relies on sanctions rather than rewards to motivate behavior. Among the many plausible reasons for this asymmetry are the
lower intrinsic costs of penalties, greater ease of administration, law's characteristic task of enforcing minimal-rather than exceptional-behavioral
norms, and a deep-rooted public sentiment that compliance with the law is a
2
duty rather than a compensable service. As legal mandates shade into the
1. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus.
LAw. 1477 (1984).
2. Scholars have studied the use of rewards to motivate law enforcement. See Gary S.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Corruptionand Optimal Law
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fine-tuned regulation of markets and complex organizations, however, the
difference between the law's objectives and those of a private employer or
principal begin to shrink. One class of examples includes so-called "gatekeepers"-parties such as accountants, lawyers, underwriters and outside
directors, who, although not primary wrongdoers, may be able to prevent
misconduct at little cost by virtue of their institutional positions.
Two factors make penalizing gatekeepers-including outside directorsespecially costly. The first is that liability may make gatekeepers overly risk
averse, particularly since they act on behalf of third parties and therefore do
not bear the full costs of taking precautionary measures or making conservative decisions.4 The second is that if, for institutional reasons, the market
fails to respond flexibly to gatekeeper liability, this liability may not only
make gatekeepers excessively risk averse and their services more costly but
also lead to an exodus of talented professionals.5 Thus, to the extent that the
law attempts to enlist gatekeepers as "cops on the beat," lawmakers face
challenges similar to those faced by principals of highly skilled agents. The
law's objective is no longer to enforce minimal standards of behavior. It is,
instead, to secure the cooperation of sophisticated actors whose knowledge
of local circumstances typically far exceeds that of enforcement officials. It
follows that the advantages of penalties over rewards are less clear-cut for
gatekeepers than for primary wrongdoers.
The law currently employs liability to motivate some-but not allgatekeepers. For example, auditors, who have an explicit monitoring methodology, are often held liable for negligence,6 while directors, whose
responsibilities are far less clear-cut, are seldom held liable for negligent
oversight.7 As we discuss below, one reason that directors escape liability is
that directorial negligence is peculiarly difficult to identify with confidence
(i.e., the legal error rate is likely to be high). Another contributing factor is
that a dense latticework of contractual risk-shifting devices-such as insurance, indemnification, and exculpatory charter provisions-insulates

Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2001); see also Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, Rewards Versus Penalties: On a New Policy Against Tax Evasion, 19 PUB. FIN. Q. 67 (1991) (developing a model
for using rewards to induce tax compliance). An analytically related topic is employers' use of bonuses and so-called efficiency wages to motivate their employees. See, e.g., Gerrit De Geest et al.,
The Intrinsic Inferiority of Efficiency Wages to ConditionalBonuses and Punitive Damages (George
Mason Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper Series No. 4-10, 2004), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=508702.
3. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining "gatekeepers" as private parties "who are able
to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers").
4. See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002)
(exploring the implications of this feature for the liability of internet service providers).
5.

See infra Section II.B.

6.
See ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELE H. HUDSON, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 5 (2006).

7. See Bernard Black et al., Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross-BorderAnalysis,
II EUR. FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005) (finding that outside directors very rarely bear out-of-pocket liability for failure to monitor management).
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directors from what little liability the law does impose 8 Given these barriers
to directorial liability, this Article asks whether rewards might be a more
workable substitute. Put differently, assuming that legal intervention is required to improve directorial oversight,9 we consider whether rewards can
outperform liability in incentivizing directors.
Much of our analysis is a comparison of two possible legal regimes: a
negligence regime in which outside directors face personal liability for failure to reasonably monitor top management, and a "reverse negligence"
regime in which directors are rewarded for satisfactorily discharging their
monitoring obligations. Both regimes stand in sharp contrast to the status
quo, in which, despite widespread belief to the contrary, directors actually
face very little pressure from liability (or rewards).'o We compare these regimes in order to isolate their common problems and, more importantly, to
locate the points at which their costs and benefits diverge. The liability regime we discuss is the familiar proposal to hold directors personally liable
for negligent monitoring. By contrast, the reward regime we outline is a decidedly unfamiliar proposal to reward directors who demonstrate that they
did not discharge their monitoring obligations negligently. We argue here
that this reward regime answers several of the most troubling drawbacks of
its liability counterpart. Given the novelty of our reverse negligence regime,
we do not expect it to find immediate acceptance. We do believe, however,
that it can yield important insight into the legal gatekeeper strategy and also
suggest less ambitious reforms that hold promise for improving directorial
monitoring of senior managers.
One more qualification. The hypothetical reward regime that we consider is almost-but not quite-the mirror image of a negligence regime. A
negligence regime imposes liability contingent upon the occurrence of a
triggering event (i.e., harm), followed by an ex post determination that the
harm resulted from the failure of an actor to perform her legal duty (i.e.,
behave reasonably). The mirror image of such a regime would make a reward contingent on the absence of harm over a period of time, and an ex
post determination that this absence was "caused" by an actor's faithful performance of her legal duties. For reasons that we develop below, however,
establishing that harm failed to occur because directors monitored adequately (or merely establishing that directors did monitor adequately over a
lengthy period) is an impossible task. Therefore, instead of framing the ab-

8. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1077-94
(2006) (analyzing in-depth the insulating effect of D&O insurance and indemnification).
9. For the position that no legal intervention is required, see Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper
Motives of the CorporateDirectors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join
Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003), and Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619
(2001). Others believe that given the cost of expanding directors' liability and the existence of market incentive for directorial oversight directors should face only a minimal risk of out-of-pocket
liability. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black et al., Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis, 162 J. INSTITUT. & THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2006).
10.

See infra Section I.A.
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sence of harm as a triggering event for possible awards, we look to the occurrence of harm just as a negligence regime does. Under our regime of
reverse negligence, directors are rewarded if, after the occurrence of harm
(or one of its correlates), they are found to have monitored reasonably, even
if theyfailed to prevent harm. In other words, we would not require directors
to prevent harm to become eligible for rewards, because we expect heightened monitoring itself to act as a deterrent against managerial misconduct,
even when it falls short of preventing harm in particular cases.
The resemblance of rewards to compensation raises a threshold issue
that we must address at the outset. A large body of literature on directorial
compensation parallels the literature on directorial liability (although the
two rarely intersect)." A principal theme of the compensation literature is
that directors ought to be paid in equity-options or restricted stock-like
senior managers, and for much the same reason: to align their financial interests with those of shareholders. Put more strongly, many commentators
view equity compensation as the principal answer to the board's incentive
problems, 2 and some might argue that firms can automatically induce effective monitoring by implementing the right sort of high-powered equity
compensation in the boardroom. We disagree for reasons that we elaborate
in Part I. 3
Our discussion is organized as follows: Part I demonstrates the limitations of equity compensation as a means of inducing directorial monitoring,
however salubrious its effects might otherwise be. Part II then expands on
the limitations and costs of negligence-based liability as a device for motivating directorial monitoring. Part III introduces the reverse negligence
regime and uses it to offer our core analytical comparison of rewards and
liability as incentive devices for outside directors. Part IV considers the potential costs of reward regimes and explores the mechanisms for addressing
such costs. This Part also explains why we neither recommend adoption of a
reward regime of the same broad scope as a negligence regime, nor expect
such a regime to be adopted any time soon. Part V applies the insights that
follow from comparing liability and rewards to frame two more modest
11.
See Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, CorporateGovernance, Executive Compensation and
Securities Litigation (Univ. of S. Cal. Law and Econ., Research Paper Series No. 04-7, 2004) (arguing that corporate governance arrangements, executive compensation, and shareholder litigation
are all substitutes for incentivizing managers), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=536963.
12. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63
U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 689-92 (1995) (paying directors in stock will "incentivize outside directors in
the large public corporation to eschew their traditional passivity"); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern
Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864-65
(1993) (encouraging directors to hold substantial equity interests would provide better oversight
incentives); Wei Shen, Improve Board Effectiveness: the Need for Incentives, 16 BRIT. J. MGMT.
S81, S86 (2005) (stating that to improve board effectiveness, directors should be compensated primarily with company stock and be required to buy a significant amount of company stock upon
joining the board).
13. In certain cases, equity pay may be a useful device for motivating lower-level employees
to engage in peer-monitoring. See Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of
Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421 (2007).
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corporate governance reforms that merit closer study. Finally, the Conclusion comments briefly on the extension of reward regimes to other classes of
gatekeepers in corporate and securities law.
I.

EQUITY COMPENSATION AS A REWARD MECHANISM

We begin with a threshold question: why should the law motivate directors to monitor, given that public companies already voluntarily "reward"

their directors with equity compensation? One might suppose that by aligning the interests of directors and shareholders, equity pay already motivates

directors to monitor management closely. 4 Better still, equity pay is selfexecuting, so no procedures are necessary to determine whether directors
are eligible for rewards. This reasoning may partly explain the increasing
popularity of equity pay for directors, 5 and why it has found favor with a
broad spectrum of observers, ranging from institutional investors
economists, 7 lawyers,'" and even the Delaware Supreme Court.' 9

6

to

Although we are agnostic about the general merits of equity pay for directors, we are certain that it cannot substitute for direct monitoring
incentives. Options and restricted stock may encourage outside directors to
advise management competently and participate meaningfully in the formu14.
At the same time, one could worry that equity pay for directors aligns their interest
with-and thus reduces their likelihood of policing-the CEOs who themselves receive hefty stockbased compensation. If equity-based compensation worked for outside directors, it would be expected to work also in the case of CEOs. But see infra note 30 (discussing plausible differences
between CEOs and outside directors).
15. See David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside
Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281 (2004).
16. See, e.g., id. at 2282 (tying directors' pay to stock performance is a frequent goal of
institutional investors' corporate governance initiatives).
17. For empirical research finding that equity pay enhances firm value, see David A. Becher
et al., Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation, 78 J. Bus. 1753
(2005) (showing that banks utilizing a high degree of equity-based director compensation exhibit
higher performance and growth); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, CorporatePerformance,
and Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885 (1999) (finding some correlation between the dollar
value of director equity-holdings and CEO turnover); and Tod Perry, Incentive Compensation for
Outside Directors and CEO Turnover (July 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.corn/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=236033 (demonstrating that equity-based director compensation is associated with better director monitoring and CEO turnover following poor performance). For research
casting doubt on the benefits of equity pay for directors, see Mason Gerety et al., Do Shareholders
Benefit from the Adoption of Incentive Pay for Directors?, 30 FIN. MGMT. 45 (2001) (showing that
the adoption of director incentive plans do not affect share price) and Nikos Vafeas, OperatingPerformance around the Adoption of DirectorIncentive Plans, 68 ECON. LETTERS 185 (2000) (finding
that the adoption of director incentive plans does not affect firms' operating performance).
18. See Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's Legacy: The Limits of
JudiciallyEnforced Constraints and the Promise of ProprietaryIncentives, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 579,
587-89 (2002) (arguing that the judicial application of the duty of care should be tailored to the
level of equity ownership by outside directors).
19. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380-81 (Del. 1995) (holding that directors who hold substantial equity stakes in a target corporation may not be presumed to vote against
their economic interests as stockholders). For an analysis, see J. Travis Laster, Exorcizing the Omnipresent Specter: The Impact of Substantial Equity Ownership by Outside Directors on Unocal
Analysis, 55 Bus. LAW. 109 (1999).
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lation of firm strategy.20 But directors also have a duty to protect investors
against managerial misconduct including, inter alia, attempts to manipulate

financial data and inflate share prices." Equity pay does not support this
duty for two reasons. First, it sometimes gives an affirmative incentive to
overlook wrongdoing. Second, to the extent that management influences the

tenure of directors, generous compensation of any sort, including equity pay,
can compromise directorial independence. 22
Consider first why equity pay might perversely encourage directors (and
other market gatekeepers)23 to overlook wrongdoing. In the short run, equity
holdings reduce a director's incentive to uncover and disclose wrongdoing
24
because doing so will normally depress share price. Companies that restate
their financial statements, for example, lose on average roughly ten percent
21
of their market value, which suggests that directors with significant share26
holdings will not be eager to report bad news. In addition, recent corporate

20. Indeed, studies finding a correlation between incentive director pay and corporate performance typically focus on the business role of directors. See Stephen Bryan & April Klein, NonManagement Director Options, Board Characteristics, and Future Firm Investments and Performance (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper Series No. 04-009, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=550506; Yermack, supra note 15. But see
Bhagat et al., supra note 17.
21.
Michael Jensen argues that one of the principal agency problems characterizing public
companies is that markets overvalue their shares. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of
Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2005).
22. Our analysis should be distinguished from the ongoing scholarly debate over whether
some forms of incentive pay are superior to others in aligning management incentives with those of
shareholders. Some economists argue that CEO stock options-but not restricted stock or bonuses-are likely to encourage misreporting. See e.g., Natasha Bums & Simi Kedia, The Impact of
Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. EcON. 35 (2006). Others posit that
restricted stocks are more likely than stock options to encourage earning management. See, e.g.,
Ohad Kadan & Jun Yang, Executive Stock Options and Earning Management: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis (Dec. 10, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=615881. Our claim is more ambitious in scope. We argue that all forms of
equity pay are likely to fail in providing directors with adequate monitoring incentives.
23. Here we include auditors and attorneys. See, e.g., Sankar De & Pradyot K. Sen, Is Auditor Moral Hazard the Only Reason to Ban Contingent Fees for Audit Services?, I INT. J. AUDIT. 175
(1997); Ronald A. Dye et al., Contingent FeesforAudit Firms, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 239 (1990).
24. This perverse incentive can also operate before misconduct occurs by discouraging measures that prevent some misconduct while increasing the probability that residual misconduct is
detected or reported ex post. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). Thus, a board preoccupied with share price
might eschew a particular control on accounting fraud if it appeared that the fraud might occur
nonetheless and the control would almost certainly detect the fraud if it did occur.
25.
TRENDS,

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., No. GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:
MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 5 (2002)

(finding an average decline of 10%); Zoe-Vonna Palmrose et al., Determinants of Market Reactions
to Restatement Announcements, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 59, 60 (2004) (finding an average decline of
9.2%).
26. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using
the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 577 (2003)
(positing that equity-based compensation is unlikely to provide incentives for directors to identify
and disclose evidence of misconduct); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Cm. L.
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debacles have typically involved fraudulent financial reporting.27 Direc-

tors-and especially members of the audit committee-have a particular
obligation to take corrective measures upon discovering problems of inaccurate disclosure,

28

which makes the link between the market price of the

company's stock and director wealth especially problematic. As a recent
paper notes, a "compensation structure in which the payout is contingent on
reported earnings cannot simultaneously incentiv[ize] the managers to
maximize profits and to report those profits honestly., 29 This intuition is
supported by the large empirical literature that documents a relationship

between equity pay and the incidence of accounting fraud and illicit earnings management. °
To be sure, imposing lengthy holding periods on directors mitigates the
incentive problems attending equity pay when financial misstatements are
modest and firms are solvent. But prolonging holding periods does not

eliminate the problem. We often wish to motivate directors to take actions
that will decrease share price without offering any prospect of an offsetting

future increase in share price. For example, directors (or auditors) have a
duty to restate the misleading financial results even if, as often happens,
bankruptcy is likely to follow a serious financial restatement." In this case,
equity pay cuts in precisely the wrong direction. And the problem is not that
directors have a short-term focus. Rather, the problem is that by diligently

1233, 1242 (2002) ("[Sjtock-based director compensation may ...increase ...ambivalence
about uncovering embarrassing facts that will reduce the share price.").
REV.

27.

Differ, 21

See John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe
OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y

198, 200-01 (2005) (discussing the widespread fraud evi-

denced by the increase in financial restatements in the United States in the late 1990s).
28. See generally Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 Bus.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=900458
(arguing that all directors should be fully aware of company statements and sufficiently engaged and
active to question and correct inadequate disclosures).
LAw.

29. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Earning Manipulation and Managerial Compensation 22 (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/S05-Crocker.pdf;
see also Susan R. Curtis, Incentive Pay, Fraud, and Self-Reported Performance Measures (Mar. 8,
2005), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=682125; Jensen, supra note
21, at 14-15 (positing that equity-based compensation cannot solve the agency problems arising
from overvalued equity).
30. For recent examples, see Merle Erickson et al., Is There a Link Between Executive Equity
Incentives and Accounting Fraud?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 113 (2006), and Shane A. Johnson et al., Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter (June 13, 2006), available
at http://papers.ssm.con/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=395960.
Although research has thus far focused on incentive pay for executives, the insights seem to
extend to directors as well. One plausible difference is that equity pay is substantially higher for
senior executives than for directors, thereby making it less likely for directors to sell stock for riskdiversification purposes. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation
and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1369-70 (2000) (arguing that equitybased compensation encourages fraud since it makes executives sell stock to diversify risk).
31. See Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, The Circumstances and Legal Consequences
of Non-GAAP Reporting: Evidence from Restatements, 21 CONTEMP. AccT. RES. 139, 145 (2004)
(companies with substantial restatements have higher frequencies of a subsequent bankruptcy or
delisting).
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performing their gatekeeping duties, directors must automatically-and
permanently-destroy the value of their shareholdings."
Even when equity compensation does not create perverse incentives,
rich equity pay-indeed, rich compensation of any sort-compromises directorial independence by increasing the opportunity costs of leaving the
board. Conventional wisdom has it that directors who openly spar with
CEOs are often eased off the board.33 Thus, we must expect well-paid directors to hesitate before pushing too hard.34 Even if a self-interested director
were certain to increase the value of her own company shares by challenging management, she might still refrain from doing so to safeguard her

"flow" of compensation during additional years of service on the board. Of
course, the pressure on outspoken directors may be more nuanced today
than it was in the past as a result of the new exchange listing requirements
that assign nomination responsibilities to independent directors. 35 But these
new requirements are unlikely to have entirely eliminated management's
36
influence over the names on next year's company slate of board nominees.
Thus, as long as CEOs exert influence over the appointment and tenure of

"their" directors, conventional forms of compensation will provide insufficient oversight incentives.37
II. THE LIMITS

OF DIRECTORIAL LIABILITY

Given that equity compensation does not provide directors with focused
monitoring incentives, we now turn to the possibility of legal interventionfirst in the form of a traditional negligence regime and then in the form of its
mirror image, a reverse negligence regime. We take it as a given that a
32. In some cases, this problem might be solved by modifying the prohibition against insider
trading to allow outside directors to trade on bad news for a brief period of time if they later disclose
it. Kristoffel R. Grechenig, The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading:An Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law, 37. U. MEM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 6-11), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=883642; Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out
About Fraud:A Theoretical Analysis of Whistle-blowing and Insider Trading, 105 MIcH. L. REV.
1899 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 293 (2004) ("[A] board member who takes the initiative to seek change
but fails to gain a consensus will lose power and probably not last long on the board.").
34. This problem is generic to gatekeeper schemes, which often rely on gatekeepers who are
hired by those they are under an obligation to monitor. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1406-07 (2002) (auditors);
Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 152-53 (2001) (attorneys).
35. See Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003); Order Approving AmEx
Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Enhanced Corporate Governance Requirements Applicable to
Listed Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,432 (Dec. 8, 2003).
36.
(2003).

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor ShareholderAccess to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAW. 43, 49

37.

LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED

PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004) (positing that compensation is a limited
solution as long as nomination is not determined by shareholders).
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negligence regime could supply directors with high-powered legal incentives to monitor senior management. The principal objection to such a
regime is that it is likely to be too costly. The best evidence for such substantial costs is that the law-either in the United States or anywhere else-

very rarely imposes liability on directors for failure to monitor management." The best evidence that the question is a close one, however, is that
there are exceptions and ambiguities that leave open the possibility of liabil-

ity in exceptional circumstances.

A. The (Very Limited) Scope of Negligence-BasedLiability

Under U.S. law, directors enjoy protection from liability for failing to
detect misconduct-or for failing to attend to other aspects of company
business-on two levels: the level of substantive law and the level of private
risk-shifting devices authorized by law.

Consider first a thumbnail sketch of director liability under substantive
law. Under state law, the principal fiduciary duty governing disinterested
directors is the duty of care; 39 that is, the injunction that directors must act
"with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. 4 ° In
the aptly-named Caremark decision, the Delaware Chancellor held that the
director's duty of care encompasses an oversight function. 4' This includes a
duty to ensure that appropriate "information and reporting systems" exist to
provide the board of directors with accurate and adequate information to
42
assess corporate compliance with legal requirements. The duty of care is
qualified, however, by the so-called business judgment rule, which bars
courts from inquiring into the content of the board's business decisions.43 As
a consequence, it is seldom possible to challenge a board's decision-making
except when, as a result of gross negligence or bad faith, the protections of
the business judgment rule do not attach. Directors only face a risk of per38.

Black et al., supra note 8, at 155, 162-63.

39. There is some uncertainty concerning the extent to which disinterested directors have an
independent duty of good faith under Delaware law. For a comprehensive analysis, see Hillary A.
Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). See also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362 (Del. 2006) (stating that the failure to act in good faith is a subsidiary element of the duty of
loyalty).
40. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS &
(1992); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1984).
41.

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 4.01

In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).

42. The jurisprudence concerning directors' oversight duty is still in its infancy, and there are
no clear standards prescribing what type of monitoring directors have to undertake in order to discharge these duties. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher L. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good
Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 701 (2004) (arguing that the
Caremark decision leaves unclear exactly what directors would need to do to meet their oversight
duties). In a recent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed directors' Caremark oversight
duties. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
43. See E.Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governancefrom 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1421-1428 (2005).
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sonal liability under state corporate law if the board is grossly negligent in

its procedures-i.e., by dealing with obviously important matters in a cursory fashion4-or if the failure to question obvious wrongdoing is so blatant
as to suggest intentionality and bad faith.45 Some commentators believe that

this procedural focus is desirable, 6 while others do not.47 But what is important for our purposes is that directors currently face very little risk of
liability for negligent oversight.
Federal law is equally reluctant to impose personal liability for oversight
failure on directors. The principal exception to this rule is Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 193348 which holds directors to a negligence-type standard

in connection with misrepresentations in the prospectus accompanying public offerings of securities.4 9 By contrast, directors are liable under the
Securities Exchange Act of 193450 only if they are shown to have acted with
"scienter," i.e., engaged in knowing misconduct. 5' In this regard, it is instructive to note the federal response to reports about the role of director
passivity in facilitating financial debacles at Enron, WorldCom, and other
companies that fell victim to financial fraud in the early years of the decade." The Enron scandals sparked numerous demands that directors be
subject to negligence-based liability for failure to exercise proper vigilance.5 3 But the federal response-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
regulations in its aftermath-did not expand director liability. Instead, these

44.

See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

45. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745,
at *40 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2004).
46. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, In Praiseof Procedure:An Economic and Behavioral Defense
of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2002) (offering
an altruism-based justification for the process-oriented nature of the business judgment rule); Rock
& Wachter, supra note 9.
47. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 26, at 567 ("So long as adherence to procedural standards, coupled with the retention of outside professionals, is sufficient to insulate directors from
personal accountability, there is little reason to expect directors to monitor management closely.").
48. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (2000)).
49.

See Sale, supra note 28, at 18.

50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
51. See Sale, supra note 28, at 17; see also Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of Financial
Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members, 43 J. AccT. RES. 291, 294 (2005) (finding that outside directors of companies that
restated their financials face little discipline through SEC action or private litigation).
52. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233 (2003) (describing director passivity at Enron); David S. Hilzenrath, "The company's
directors were all too often a passive rubber stamp for management and especially Mr. Ebbers":
How a Distinguished Roster of Board Members Failed to Detect Company's Problems, WASH. POST,
June 16, 2003, at El (describing findings concerning director conduct at WorldCom); Floyd Norris,
Ebbers and Passive Directors Blamed for WorldCom Woes: Board That Made Decisions in Haste
With No Questioning, N.Y. T'MES, June 10, 2003, at CI (same).
53. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
FiduciaryDuty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393 (2005).
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reforms focused on regulating board independence and assigning increasing
responsibilities to specialized committees, such as the audit committee.54 In
particular, very little in the new regulations addresses the scope of directors'
oversight obligations.55 To the contrary, the SEC has refused to prescribe the

manner in which members of the audit committee should execute their oversight responsibilities.56
In addition to state and federal substantive law, state law authorizes a
second level of legal insulation for corporate directors through a variety of

private risk-shifting devices. Delaware law, for example, explicitly endorses
permissive indemnification and insurance of virtually all directorial liability
costs that do not result from fraud or similar intentional wrongdoing.57
Moreover, all states now authorize companies to adopt charter provisions
that exculpate directors from monetary liability for breaching the duty of
care." Finally, the frequent settlement of derivative litigation and class actions against directors-the chief mechanisms for enforcing the directors'

monitoring obligations-assures that only a tiny percentage of cases are
ever adjudicated. The vast majority of lawsuits are either dismissed or settled-with the companies and their insurers picking up the tabs.5 9 The
bottom 60line is that directors almost never bear out-of-pocket liability ex-

penses.

B. The Costs of Negligence-Based Liability

The principal policy argument against director liability for faulty monitoring is that the costs outweigh the benefits, largely because such a regime

would have high error rates. 6' The courts would frequently err in deciding in

54.

Id. at 400-05.

55. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 26, at 572 (explaining that it is unclear to what extent
members of the audit committee are responsible for making independent assessments of the quality
of issuers' internal controls, financial statements, and financial reports).
56. See Standards Relating To Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788,
18,796 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274) ("[Tlhese specific
decisions regarding the execution of the audit committee's oversight responsibilities, as well as
decisions regarding the extent of desired involvement by the audit committee, are best left to the
discretion of the audit committee....").
57.

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, § 145(a), (g) (2001) (indemnification and insurance).

58. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State CorporateLaw in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 317, 332 n.93 (2004) (noting that by 2003, all fifty states had
adopted statutes enabling corporations to limit or eliminate personal liability for directors).
59. Black et al., supra note 8, at 158-61.
to indemnify directors.

The SEC may attempt to limit companies' ability

60. In the well-publicized cases of Enron and WorldCom, outside directors agreed to pay
substantial amounts to settle securities class action lawsuits. On the implications of these settlements, see Black et al., supra note 8.
61. This section offers what we believe is a sensible synthesis of the prevailing objections to
enhancing directorial liability. We do not necessarily endorse these objections. Rather, our goal is to
lay the framework within which we can later evaluate the benefits of a reward regime.
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hindsight whether directors acted reasonably, and plaintiffs' lawyers would
multiply the errors by pursuing actions against directors with little genuine
regard for the merits. 6' A high error rate, in turn, would impose significant
risk-bearing costs on directors. 64 At a minimum, directors would demand
insurance against negligence-based liability risk or compensation for bearing it. It follows that if out-of-pocket negligence-based liability became
common, Director and Officer ("D&O") insurance premiums would increase an order of magnitude, directors would receive much larger fees, orthe most likely outcome-premiums and fees would both increase significantly. But to the extent that firms were able to insure against the expected
liability costs of their directors, they might blunt the incentive function of
negligence-based liability. Thus, it might be necessary to consider limiting
D&O insurance coverage and indemnification arrangements in order to
maintain liability incentives, and it surely would be necessary to void charter provisions that insulate directors from monetary liability for breach of
their duty of care.
If directors were unable to shift liability risk, however, companies would
face additional costs that might far exceed the direct risk-bearing costs to
their directors. One of these costs is the agency cost of risk-distorted
decision-making by the board, and another is a diminished pool of candidates from which to recruit new directors. Both of these costs are well
known and widely discussed. The principal agency cost is the danger that
negligence-based liability would induce directors to make overly cautious
decisions to reduce the likelihood of a company failure for which they might
be sued.6 An ancillary concern is that directors would overinvest in compliance measures in order to reduce the likelihood that they would be held
liable if a lawsuit were filed.66 Economists have shown that negligence standards might induce defendants in general to be overly cautious when courts
67
are prone to error. For directors, however, this bias toward excessive caution is likely to be exacerbated since the cost of caution is borne by the
corporation rather than the directors themselves. Consider, for example, the
possible loss to the firm that might follow from a board's decision to select a
cautious CEO over an entrepreneurial one, or to impose a rigid, hierarchical
management structure over a flexible one.
62.
1424.
63.

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 114-15; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 43, at
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation without Foundation?,7 J.L.

EcON. & ORG.

55 (1991).

64. It might also create perverse incentives to ignore misconduct. See Jennifer Arlen, The
PotentiallyPerverse Effects of Corporate CriminalLiability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
65. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 43, at 1422-25 (discussing how liability might stifle
risky business initiatives).
66. See Black et al., supra note 9, at 17 (explaining that boards might adopt "excessively
bureaucratic procedures" as a response to a heightened liability risk).
67. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determinationof
Liability, 37 J.L. & EcoN 1, 2 (1994).
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Similarly, liability creates a problem of recruitment for boards insofar as
68
it might lead many potential directors to refuse to serve. In theory,
companies could always raise board fees to offset an enhanced risk of negligence-based liability. However, offering outside directors substantially
higher fees might undermine their independence and further decrease their
willingness to take risks.69 Moreover, potential directors have heterogeneous
assets and reputations at stake; fees set to compensate modal directors
would fail to attract the wealthiest or most illustrious candidates. The concern that expanding liability would discourage the most qualified candidates

from joining boards appears to have a strong influence
on lawmakers, moti70
vating them to insulate directors from liability.
Finally, of course, there would be an enormous political cost to any ef-

fort to impose negligence-based liability on directors, particularly if such a
reform also sought to restrict indemnification, insurance, the business judgment rule, exculpatory charter provisions, and the board's power to fund
settlements with the plaintiffs' bar-in short, the entire arsenal of riskshifting devices that are an accepted part of shareholder litigation today.
There is no organized group to bear this cost, least of all corporate shareholders, who have consistently voted to eliminate directors' monetary
liability for breach of the duty of care whenever the matter has been put to a
71
shareholder vote.
III.

THE BENEFITS OF DIRECTORIAL REWARDS

The costs of negligence-based liability for directors lead directly to the
central question of this Article: namely, whether it is possible to erect a less
costly reward regime that has roughly the same incentive power 72 as a tradi68.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 26, at 1244 (noting that measures to enhance director liability for breaching the duty of care "may have the perverse effect of discouraging board service by the
well-qualified, especially for corporations facing significant business challenges"); Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors'and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L.
I, 1-2 (1989) ("There are reports of directors resigning because their firms had lost insurance coverage and of individuals declining invitations to serve on boards in increasing numbers.").
69.

See Black et al., supra note 9, at 18-19.

70. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis,
39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1162 (1990) (arguing that states that allow corporations to indemnify directors
"hope to prevent an exodus of qualified directors from boards"); Gregory S. Rowland, Earning
Management, the SEC, and CorporateGovernance: DirectorLiability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 201-202 (2002) (reviewing pressures on the SEC to protect
audit committee members from liability under the concern that liability would reduce ability to find
qualified members).
71.
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477,
490 (2000) ("[Olut of one hundred 'Fortune 500' companies, ninety-eight of the stock corporations
that incorporated in jurisdictions allowing for exculpatory charter provisions have adopted such
provisions.").
72.
To produce an equal incentive power, rewards and liability regimes may slightly differ in
monetary size. For example, research shows that individuals tend to view gains and losses differently. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) ("The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money
appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount."). If these findings
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tional negligence regime? A reward regime can easily mimic the incentive
features of a liability regime;7 1 the critical issue is whether it can do so at
less cost.
To answer this question, we first elaborate a reward regime-reverse
negligence-that parallels negligence liability. We then explore the advantages of a reverse negligence regime as it compares with a traditional
negligence regime. A reward regime of this sort would reduce the error rate,
alleviate the problem of distorted decision-making, reduce recruitment
costs, and would not be subject to dilution by private risk-shifting arrangements. Reverse negligence would also facilitate the development of an
informed market for directors. In the next Part, we discuss the extent to
which a reward regime can be expected to produce its own costs. Throughout this discussion we will use the74 terms "reward regime" and "reverse
negligence regime" interchangeably.
A. How a Reverse Negligence Regime Works
Like negligence-based liability, reverse negligence builds on a civil lawsuit that turns on the reasonableness of a director's conduct. Unlike a
negligence regime, however, directors would sue as plaintiffs under a reverse negligence regime, on the theory that their conduct had met or
exceeded a legal standard. As we discuss below, successful suits would result in substantial awards.7 ' However, directors could only bring suit in the
aftermath of certain triggering events that caused-or were associated
with-harm to the company. Possible triggering events might include major
76
financial restatements, settlements of shareholder suits resulting in monetary payment above a threshold amount, or the opening of investigations by
the SEC.
The function of a triggering event is to ensure that a reverse negligence
regime is administrable. Linking rewards to triggering events has several
advantages over the alternative of inspecting board conduct periodically or
apply to outside directors, then the reward amount will have to be adjusted upward to offset this
effect.
73. Assume that it is socially desirable for directors to make an investment valued at $50 in
reviewing the company's financial statements. Compare a liability regime under which directors
must pay a penalty of $100 if they fail to make this investment to a reward regime under which
directors are paid $100 if they do make this investment. Under the liability regime, directors will
weigh the cost of $50 against their expected liability for failure to monitor-$100. Under the reward
regime, directors will weigh the cost of $50 against their expected payment for adequate monitoring-$100. Both regimes, therefore, provide comparable incentives under these circumstances.
74. Note that we do not propose to displace the existing regime of directorial liability.
Rather, our analysis compares a hypothetical reverse negligence regime to a hypothetical negligence
regime.
75.

See infra Section IV.B.

76. Not all financial restatements are the result of management wrongdoing. See Jeffrey L.
Callen et al., Accounting Restatements: Are They Always Bad News for Investors?, J. INVESTING,
Fall 2006, at 57, 57. The import of financial restatements has already received legal recognition in
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which forces the partial return of executive compensation
after financial restatements under certain circumstances. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243(a) (2002).
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randomly, even in the absence of harm. First, given the wide range of directorial responsibilities, it is difficult to specify what would amount to
"adequate oversight" of management without reference to a particular risk.
Vigilance is most easily observed when incipient crises reveal a director's
growing awareness of her company's problems and the desire to respond
appropriately. Focusing on directorial conduct in the aftermath of wrongdoing or mismanagement thus allows courts to tailor their scrutiny to specific
circumstances and concrete harms. Second, subjecting all public companies
to routine inspections would require costly evaluation procedures even for
companies in which directors' vigilance is relatively less valuable." By contrast, a triggering-event requirement limits judicial review to precisely those
circumstances in which vigilance is most valuable because managerial misconduct is most likely, and the allegiance of directors to their monitoring
obligations is most likely to be tested. Third, the triggering-event requirement economizes on investigation costs, since events of this magnitude will
ordinarily spark inquiries into management behavior in any case.7 8 And finally, allowing directors to claim rewards only in the aftermath of certain
triggering events alleviates the financial burden of funding rewards.
Closely related to the issue of when to evaluate directorial conduct under
a reverse negligence regime is the question of what standard of review a
court should employ. A natural answer is a "reverse negligence" standard: if
a negligence regime imposes liability for failing to exercise due care, a reverse negligence regime ought to reward the director who does take due care
in monitoring management. Note that this standard does not imply its converse, that is, not every director who might have escaped liability under a
negligence regime would be eligible for a reward under a reward regime.
This is because a director seeking a reward under this regime carries the
burden of affirmatively proving that her conduct met or exceeded a standard
of reasonable vigilance. Thus, only directors who can establish their vigilance would receive a reward.79

Assume for the moment that lawmakers establish a reverse negligence
regime as we have described it above. How does such a regime compare to a

77. Directors' vigilance is valuable to the extent that it prevents management misconduct.
When misconduct is unlikely-because management is honest, for example-the value of directorial oversight is relatively small.
78. More accurately, the triggering-event requirement reduces the per-company cost of
evaluating directors' conduct. In contrast, total inspection costs could be reduced even without the
triggering-event requirement by reducing the number of companies inspected while adjusting upward the magnitude of the reward. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968).
79. Of course, variations are possible as well. For example, one could imagine a "reverse
gross negligence rule," under which a director would be required to prove that her conduct was not
merely reasonable, but exceeded the level of vigilance normally expected of outside directors. This
modification would ensure that only those directors who demonstrated exemplary vigilance would
qualify for a reward. In addition, this rule would enhance the reputational benefits associated with
the reward while mitigating any plausible adverse effect on the reputation of directors who failed to
qualify for a reward.
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traditional negligence regime with similar incentive properties? As we explain in the remainder of this Part, the answer is that it compares quite well.
B. ErrorRates
Take error rates first. Recall that most of the costs we attribute to a regime of negligence-based liability for outside directors arise because we
(and virtually everyone else) assume that error rates would be high in the
adjudication of liability suits challenging directorial conduct. This assumption is less plausible under a reverse negligence regime. Under a negligence
regime, directors are likely to close ranks and stay silent to bolster the
board's collective defense, while under a reverse negligence regime they
have a strong incentive to produce information because they carry the burden of establishing that they complied with their legal duties. Thus, reverse
negligence encourages insiders to produce firsthand accounts of boardroom
behavior that are highly probative, even if sometimes self-serving.
A second reason why we expect more accuracy from a reverse negligence rule is that it does not rely on the plaintiffs' bar to initiate suits but
requires outside directors themselves to bring actions to seek rewards.'s Relying on the plaintiffs' bar to file lawsuits is not only inherently costly 8' but
also opens the door to abusive suits. 8 2 By contrast, we expect the directors
seeking rewards to behave less strategically than members of the plaintiffs'
bar, partly because of reputational constraints and partly because company
insiders can easily verify or dispute their accounts. In addition, actions
brought by directors to obtain rewards would lack certain features that encourage abusive lawsuits, such as asymmetric stakes and the prospect of
obtaining significant fees. 83 Thus adjudication of rewards under a reverse
negligence regime is likely to be cheaper and more accurate than adjudication of liability under a parallel negligence regime. 4
C. Recruitment
Of course, a reverse negligence regime can only reduce legal error, not
eliminate it. Courts will inevitably make mistakes in assessing directorial
conduct, given hindsight bias and the open-ended character of directorial

80. As we explain in Section IV.C below, one of the key challenges in designing reward
regimes is inducing directors to file reward claims. It is thus likely that reward regimes would depend on independent third parties to initiate reward inquiries. This might further increase the
accuracy of the regime.
81.

See, e.g., Romano, supra note 63.

82. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, ClassAction Reform: Lessons frm Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 533, 535-36 (1997) (describing the concern that class attorneys file frivolous claims solely
for their settlement value).
83. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-OrientedClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133, 153-54 (2004).
84. Furthermore, risk averse directors have far less incentive to sell their contingent claims
on rewards than they do to protect themselves against the risk of catastrophic liability.
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duties. A second advantage of reverse negligence, however, is that it lowers
81

the costs of the legal errors that do occur.
Consider the costs of recruiting qualified directors. As compared to a liability regime, reverse negligence substitutes the prospect of a fixed reward

for the threat of penalty under a liability regime-a penalty that would vary
with the assets and professional reputations of individual directors. Negligence-based liability must inevitably deter some candidates from serving on
boards (in the absence of liability insurance), unless firms pay directors
enough to offset the expected costs of serving for even the wealthiest and
most reputable directors. By contrast, reverse negligence does not deter

anyone from accepting a board seat. All directors who faithfully discharge
their duties during a triggering crisis are eligible for the same reward, and

directors who do not seek a reward in the wake of a crisis are not penalized
on this account. Reverse negligence does not put directors' personal wealth
at risk,16 but it is also unlikely to put their reputations at risk. On the con-

trary, directors who qualify for rewards plausibly enhance their reputations
among investors, while directors who fail to obtain rewards suffer little reputational harm." Thus, qualified candidates have no economic reason to
avoid board seats under a reverse negligence regime, and there is even reason to expect that they might prefer to sit on the boards of risky companies,
where the ex ante probability of receiving a reward is higher than elsewhere.
More generally, the reverse negligence rule might serve to foster a market for vigilant directors. It is commonly assumed that directors today are

influenced as much by reputational concerns as by monetary incentives.
There
. 89is evidence that directors at failing companies suffer reputational penalties. Yet, under existing conditions, the market for directors has little
opportunity to evaluate the quality of individual directors, especially direc-

tors who exercise exceptional vigilance in the boardroom. If, for example, a

85. In this Section, we compare a reward regime to a hypothetical liability regime undiluted
by private risk-shifting arrangements. Likewise, we assume that public companies do not offer their
directors compensation packages that vary by assets or reputation.
86. Reward regimes will likely reduce other components of director pay. This decrease might
not equal the expected reward amount, since risk-averse directors might demand that companies
increase their fixed pay amounts to offset the additional risk associated with contingent rewards.
87. Those who cannot demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they fully performed their fiduciary duties need not fear stigma. All the market learns is that that the evidence to
support a reward was missing or that the director in question did not apply for a reward. See also
infra Section IV.C. (addressing the risk of affirmative findings of negligence).
88. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). But see Ren6e B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Do Directors Perform for
Pay? (EFA, 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4460, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=565942 (finding a positive link between attendance-based director fees
and director attendance behavior).
89. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy,boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes
in corporateownership and control when firms default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (explaining that
directors hold fewer directorial positions after their companies undergo bankruptcy); Srinivasan,
supra note 51 (explaining that directors of companies that restated their financials suffered labor
market penalties).
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board terminates the employment of the CEO of an underperforming company, the public is unlikely to discover which directors took the behind-thescenes initiative in orchestrating a change of leadership. In contrast, a wellfunctioning reward regime would celebrate the achievements of just these
directors. It would single out and compensate directors who demonstrated
exemplary performance or who assumed a leadership role during a time of
crisis for the company. In this way, a reward regime would offset the collective action problem that is inherent in a collective decision-making body
such as a corporate board. Equally important, publication of the basis for
making a monitoring award to a director would give institutional investors
and other corporate outsiders information about the quality of individual
directors, who might then be nominated to other boards.
D. Decision-making
After recruitment difficulties, commentators generally treat risk-averse
decision-making as the second major cost of imposing negligence-based
liability on directors when the risk of legal error is significant. A reverse
negligence rule significantly reduces this cost as well. Two elements of liability regimes encourage directors to be overly cautious. First, because
liability typically follows a harmful event, such as a disastrous business failure or a major financial restatement, the risk of liability arising from legal
error discourages directors from making decisions that would increase the
company's risk profile. 9° Second, because directors escape liability by convincing a court that they acted diligently, they may overinvest in monitoring
to assure that they meet the applicable due care standard.
To illustrate, consider the following example. Suppose that a company's
board is asked to approve a related-party transaction, say a joint venture
with the company's CFO. 91Although the stated purpose of this transaction is
to allow the company to exploit a unique business opportunity, some directors suspect that it might also be designed to allow management to
manipulate the company's earnings. A negligence regime might produce two
92
distortions. First, and more importantly, the suspicious directors might persuade the board to veto the transaction without considering its potential
benefits, merely because giving approval to the transaction would increase
the liability exposure of the entire board. Second, if the transaction is approved, directors might excessively invest in monitoring the company's
financial statements to ensure their accuracy.
Now consider the costs associated with the same example under a reverse negligence regime. Although reverse negligence does little to alleviate
90.

See, e.g.,

FRANK

OF CORPORATE LAW 98-99

H.

EASTERBROOK & DANIEL

R.

FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

(1991).

91. This example freely draws on some of the facts underlying the Enron debacle. For a
description of the Enron transactions, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1306-14 (2002).
92. The opportunity cost of distorted decision-making for a large company would normally
far exceed the cost of excessively bureaucratic procedures that the board might adopt.
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the ancillary problem of over-compliance, 3 it entirely eliminates the principal problem that directors might be induced to shun a valuable but risky
transaction. Under a reverse negligence regime, the modest risk that the proposed transaction might give rise to earnings manipulation and a financial
restatement is not a personal risk to directors at all. Indeed, our directors
will earn a reward only if they approve the transaction, and it is subsequently discovered to be a manipulative tool that triggers a financial
restatement. Modest suspicions or concerns will lead directors to dig deeper
under a reward regime, but they will not lead to the vetoing of seemingly
valuable transactions or projects. Of course, one might ask whether rewards
could have the opposite effect-that is, of inducing directors to make risky
decisions opportunistically in order to become eligible for windfall gains. 94
We discuss this question in Part IV below.
E. Risk Shifting

Reverse negligence offers another advantage over liability that, while
not fundamental as a conceptual matter, is very important as a practical one:
rewards are unlikely to trigger contractual risk-shifting devices such as liability insurance and indemnification. The usual justification for these
devices-that they are necessary to recruit risk-averse directors-simply
does not apply to rewards because companies and their directors lack an
obvious reason to contract out of a reward regime. Indeed, attempting to do
so by entering into a "reverse indemnification" contract 9s might appear suspicious, given that a reward regime does not put directors' personal wealth
at risk. The upshot is that reward incentives are likely to remain undiluted
whereas liability incentives are not unless risk-shifting devices are banned
or regulated.
How far liability insurance and indemnification undermine deterrence is
a complicated question with no clear answer.9 6 However, for those who believe that these arrangements improperly dilute director oversight incentives,
a regime that can incentivize directors without triggering insurance and indemnification agreements should be a welcome development. Indeed,
reverse negligence should appeal even to those who believe that pervasive
risk shifting is currently necessary in order to achieve the right balance of
93. Rewards do not put directors' reputations at risk. Instead, they offer diligent directors the
prospect of receiving a fixed amount contingent on the occurrence of certain events. Since the potential benefits from caretaking are limited, directors would have a weaker incentive than under a
negligence regime to exercise excessive precaution.
94. Cf Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirtnative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 886 (1986) (suggesting that large
rewards might induce potential rescuers to create a demand for their services by putting others at
risk).
95. Under a reverse indemnification agreement, a director would waive rights to petition for
a reward in exchange for higher fixed compensation.
96. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of liability insurance on deterrence, see
Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 166 (2000).
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directorial liability and insulation,97 because rewards reduce the need to rely
on risk shifting-and hence the transaction costs associated with their negotiation and subsequent triggering."
IV. OBSTACLES

TO A REWARD REGIME

We have shown thus far that a reverse negligence rule addresses many of
the principal shortcomings of negligence-based liability for directors. In this
Part, we consider the drawbacks of reverse negligence. We conclude that
even though reverse negligence is less costly than a parallel liability regime,
it is unlikely to succeed as a reform proposal. The chief reason is that reverse negligence would encounter stiff cultural and political resistance to its
key elements, especially court-ordered reward payments for directors. More
generally, this Part identifies the novel challenges facing policymakers seeking to devise workable reward regimes for outside directors: overcoming
moral hazard problems, ensuring funding, computing award amounts, and
overcoming political skepticism. The next Part uses the insights of this
analysis to propose alternative reward regimes.
A. Moral Hazard
We have described how the triggering-event requirement in a reverse
negligence regime alleviates the problem of risk-averse decision-making by
directors, but left open the question whether this requirement might also
induce directors to approve excessively risky corporate actions to become
eligible for rewards. This concern arises when board conduct takes place
over multiple time periods, including an ex ante period when misconduct
can be prevented and an ex post period when it can be detected but no
longer prevented. In this case, one might argue that directors would fail to
press for preventive measures ex ante but nonetheless display exemplary
vigilance ex post. Put differently, the prospect of a reward for discovering
misconduct might discourage its prevention. Consider again the self-dealing
example discussed in Part III, in which a vigilant director earns a reward
only if the company restates its financials. This circumstance, the argument
goes, would give each director an incentive to approve the suspect selfdealing transaction in the hope that she could then earn a reward by making
an exemplary effort to uncover wrongdoing.
At the level of legal design, lawmakers could address this problem by
making rewards contingent upon a showing of appropriate conduct in all

97. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 9, at 17-19 (explaining why a tiny risk of out-of-pocket
liability might be optimal); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (1999) (same).
98. Some argue that the decoupling of nominal from actual liability is designed to provide
the plaintiff bar with sufficient incentive to bring suits. See Maria Gutirrrez, An Economic Analysis
of Corporate Directors' FiduciaryDuties, 34 RAND J. ECON. 516 (2003); Kamar, supra note 97.
Under a reward regime, in contrast, directors will initiate reward claims and capture the entire
amount of the reward.
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relevant time periods, including the initial period in which misconduct
might have been prevented. 99 If courts could always spot opportunistic
decision-making ex post, directors would never engage in it. Our working
assumption, however, is that courts will make errors, particularly in evaluating the open-ended obligations of directors. Given this assumption, the
requirement that directors only become eligible for rewards after the occurrence of a harm-related event will inevitably create some incentive for
directors to approve overly risky projects and transactions.
But if the moral hazard problem is real, its dimensions are likely to be
modest. Most directors will not hope for financial scandal or criminal prosecution on their watch under any circumstances. Crises of this sort would not
only adversely affect their reputations and reduce the value of their stock,
but also increase their risk of personal liability, especially for directors who
appeared to have consciously contributed to corporate failures. Reverse negligence would induce directors to act opportunistically only if the expected
rewards outweighed directors' considerable market and legal incentives to
avert corporate failures.
Moreover, directors must prove that they acted with reasonable vigilance
in all relevant periods in order to earn rewards. A director who acted opportunistically would encounter two important obstacles to capitalizing on her
efforts to induce a triggering event. The first is the hindsight bias of the
court, which is likely to be particularly tough in evaluating director conduct
in the aftermath of a corporate failure. The second is likely competition
from other reward claimants on the board, who could provide the court with
detailed information about the behavior of the opportunistic director. Indeed,
competition over rewards would be particularly effective in producing information if the reverse negligence regime limited eligibility for rewards to
a small number of directors.
Finally, even if a few directors were to behave opportunistically under a
reverse negligence rule, their impact on the incidence of misconduct is unclear. On the one hand, the presence of opportunistic directors would make
boards less likely to prevent managers from initiating misconduct; on the
other, these directors might also discourage opportunistic managers from
initiating misconduct in the first instance. Consider again our self-dealing
example. Assume that the transaction was indeed a sham designed to facilitate earnings manipulation, and that savvy but opportunistic directors
suspected as much but were nonetheless willing to approve the deal in order
to uncover the fraud later on and thereby earn a reward. In this case, managers with fraudulent intentions would have reason to fear that easy board
approval was little short of an invitation to an ambush. They would have
little to gain-and much to lose-from initiating a deal that the board approved only in the hope that it could subsequently be exposed as a fraud.

99. Cf Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687 (1997) (exploring plausible mechanisms to
address a similar problem on the liability side).
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B. Funding
A reverse negligence regime must fund both its rewards and the costs of
administering them. At first glance, the corporation itself would seem to be
the most attractive funding source. A director--or a former director-might
demand a reward and, if it were not forthcoming, sue the corporation. But
even apart from the awkwardness of inviting directors to sue their own companies, direct corporate funding of rewards would create two major
problems. First, there is a risk of collusion. Supposedly disinterested directors and managers might fail to contest reward claims in court, especially
claims brought by continuing directors who remain on the board. If this
practice became entrenched, a reward regime might soon degenerate into its
opposite, namely, a kind of payoff for directors who turned a blind eye to
signs of misconduct. Second, many corporations might lack the resources to
pay rewards, especially since reward payouts would occur only in the aftermath of triggering events that are often associated with financial distress.
Relying exclusively on corporate funding, then, might cripple a reward regime in just those circumstances in which its incentives are most needed.
If direct corporate funding is unsuitable, what options remain? Although
government funding could eliminate collusion concerns and ensure the
availability of rewards even for insolvent companies, it would understandably provoke objections as a highly visible public subsidy of the costs of
corporate governance. A market solution to the funding problem is therefore
preferable. One possibility is to encourage companies to purchase "reward
insurance" from third parties who would also undertake the tasks of screening and litigating reward claims. These insurers would have no reason to
collude with (or retaliate against) petitioning directors, and they would have
every incentive to process claims on the merits. Directors would be saved
the embarrassment of litigating against their own companies. And finally,
turning to solvent insurers would guarantee that meritorious reward claims
would always be paid, even if the corporations that gave rise to them subsequently went bankrupt.
C. Computing Reward Amounts
Relative to negligence-based liability, a key drawback of reverse negligence is the possible misalignment of incentives that follows from the
difficulty of picking optimal levels of rewards. Negligence regimes conventionally set damages equal to the actual harm resulting from misconduct,
which is optimal assuming that all concerned have perfect information. An
analogous calculation for reverse negligence would set rewards equal to the
value of the expected harm that a director prevented by meeting her monitoring obligations. We suspect, however, that courts operating with
imperfect information can rarely get damages right under an ordinary

100.

See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J.

LEGAL STUD.

1 (1980).
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negligence rule, much less divine the hypothetical savings produced by directors' vigilance under a reverse negligence regime.
Rather than setting payouts on a case-by-case basis, reward regirn'es presumably would need to adopt a fixed formula. In the case of directors, the
award could be a multiple of board fees or a fraction of annual CEO compensation. The payouts need only be large enough to motivate even wealthy
directors (after discounting for the likelihood of the occurrence of a triggering event) to monitor diligently and then initiate reward claims. Payouts also
ought to be small enough to temper public outrage. Any qualifying figure
(say $5 million for an S&P 500 firm) will do as well as any other.
To be sure, the necessity of using a fixed formula would constitute a major drawback of reward regimes in those areas in which liability regimes
produce optimal incentives merely by setting damages to equal social harm.
This last description, however, does not seem to apply to outside directors.
To begin, the prescription that damages should equal social harm does not
necessarily apply in the case of director liability. Many believe that optimal
sanctions for directors' negligent oversight are far smaller than the harm
associated with corporate failure.' °' Although a full analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, we suspect this intuition to be correct. One reason is
the well-known result that negligence-based rules can produce optimal incentives even when sanctions differ from social harm. °2 But a second, more
important reason is, we suspect, that the cost of optimal monitoring by directors is normally far smaller than the expected harm from an oversight
failure. Beyond a certain threshold, therefore, enhancing liability exposure is
likely to produce substantial costs, but insignificant deterrence benefits.
With respect to securities fraud, moreover, it is unclear whether the existing
liability regime's measures of damages-loosely based on investors' out-ofpocket losses-accurately reflect social harm produced by a misleading disclosure.'0 3
The reward payout must also be large enough to induce directors to file
claims. Under the reverse negligence rule, inducing directors to file claims
has both reputational and cultural dimensions. As a cultural matter, filing a
claim is likely to carry a faint odor of mercenary intent during the initial
years of the regime. From a reputational perspective, initiating a reward
claim risks an affirmative judicial finding that director failed to exercise
proper vigilance. To be sure, directors who merely failed to prove that they
101.
See Black et al., supra note 9, at 17-18 (concluding that a near-zero risk of out-of-pocket
liability for outside directors may be optimal); Kamar, supra note 97, at 896-900 (low and frequent
sanctions are optimal in corporate law).
102. Setting sanctions higher than harm will not induce directors to exercise over-caution
since exercising the "due" level of care shields directors from liability. See STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-52 (2004); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). When sanctions are lower than harm, a negligence standard
would have a stronger incentive effect than strict liability. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof
Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45, 47-49 (1986).

103.

See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48

STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damagesfor Open-Market Securities
Fraud, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 639 (1996).
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performed their duties would not fear stigma. But a party defending against
a reward claim (whether the company or an insurer) might argue that a director not only failed to carry her burden of proof but was also affirmatively
negligent or worse, and a court that made findings to this effect would severely damage the director's reputation. This risk is exacerbated by the
open-ended nature of the reverse negligence rule, and the hindsight bias afflicting courts in the aftermath of serious management misconduct. Hence,
unless directors were offered the prospect of very large rewards, they would
be likely to give up the opportunity of receiving a reward to safeguard their
reputations.'04
D. Board Divisiveness
The reverse negligence rule aims at motivating directors to become vigilant gatekeepers of management. One could argue, however, that rewards
would interfere with board cohesiveness and the trust between the board and
senior management, as directors wishing to qualify for rewards would become adversarial and uncooperative.
We would first like to note that any form of external legal interventionrewards and liability alike-interferes with board cohesiveness and group
dynamics.' 5 Indeed, one of the key objections to holding directors liable for
oversight failures is that such intervention adversely affects trust and cooperation within boards.'0 Conversely, those who support measures to enhance
directors' liability believe that it is necessary to overcome the reluctance of
individual directors to challenge group consensus.'0 7 We do not take a position in this debate. 0 8s As we explained earlier, this Article explores the
potential benefits of rewards under the assumption that legal intervention is
required to motivate vigilance.
The important question for us, therefore, is whether rewards are inherently more likely than liability to disrupt board cohesiveness. Liability
104. Several measures can overcome this concern. First, leaving courts out of the picture
would make it less likely that fact finders would feel compelled to arrive at affirmative findings of
directorial failure or publicize such findings. Second, policymakers could reduce uncertainty by
specifying in advance what types of director conduct would merit a reward. Third, policymakers
could limit reward eligibility to directors demonstrating exceptional vigilance. Finally, policymakers
could devise a procedure under which third parties initiate the examination into directors' conduct.
In the next Part, we sketch reward regimes that take advantage of some of these mechanisms.
105. See generally Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797
(2001).
106. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board: Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2002) (arguing that judicial review might destroy the
interpersonal relationships that foster internal board governance).
107. See, e.g., James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435 (2004); O'Connor, supra note 52.
108. See also Rene B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=453960 (developing a model showing that management-friendly boards may be an optimal governance
structure under certain circumstances).
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arguably creates a common incentive for all directors to take measures that
would reduce the risk of being found liable.' Rewards, in contrast, might
create intra-board rivalry, especially if they are limited to exceptional conduct or a small number of directors. In order to be entitled to a reward, so
the argument goes, a director would have to establish that she outperformed
her peers. We judge the disruptive effect of rewards to be small, given the
careful screening of directors for public companies, the powerful norms
governing the behavior of individuals within small groups such as corporate
boards, and the large ensemble of market and reputational incentives that act
on corporate directors.
E. PoliticalSkepticism
We expect political acceptability to be the principal obstacle to reverse
negligence. The reverse negligence rule requires extensive legal design. It
must be synchronized with the existing regime of director liability under
both securities and corporate laws. This, in turn, requires lawmakers to address thorny questions, such as whether a single court should handle both
liability and reward disputes, and the proper impact of settlements in shareholder lawsuits on a director's reward eligibility. Lawmakers would have to
determine whether reverse negligence will be part of federal securities laws
or state corporate law. Resolving these issues would require legislation and
thus solid political support.
But the reverse negligence regime would have to overcome three sources
of political resistance. First, the business community would likely oppose
any reform-whether a rewards or a liability regime-that would empower
courts to evaluate director conduct in hindsight. Second, the general public,
which might well support a liability regime in a populist mood, would presumably react skeptically to a regime that rewards directors in the aftermath
of corporate crises. Finally, the reverse negligence rule runs against deeply
entrenched institutional and cultural norms under which courts' role is to
impose sanctions rather than distribute rewards. Even judges might resist the
notion that directors of failing companies should be rewarded for what
might be perceived as merely doing their job (and failing). To be sure, clarifying the aims of this regime-encouraging vigilance to deter management
wrongdoing-might persuade the business community, the public, and the
judiciary to appreciate the benefits that it offers. But it is difficult to identify
a group that would be willing to bear the significant cost of such an educational campaign.
To summarize, as a technical matter, reverse negligence appears to be
workable and, on balance, superior to negligence-based liability for directors. It would be no more costly to administer than a negligence regime and
far less likely to distort board decision-making or recruitment practices.
With proper legal design, reverse negligence would not disrupt established
109. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 126 ("Duty-of-care litigation is typically concerned with
collective actions taken by the board of directors as a whole.").
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bodies of law and practice, such as the business judgment rule, the permissive conventions governing director indemnification and insurance, and the
director exculpation provisions common in corporate charters. But the lack
of sufficient political support presently renders this regime an unlikely candidate for success. Moreover, relative to the status quo, the principal policy
objection to reverse negligence is also the principal policy objection to a
negligence regime: the concern that courts won't get it right in evaluating
director conduct in hindsight.

V. TOWARD WORKABLE

REFORM

The reverse negligence regime is problematic given political skepticism
and prevailing cultural and legal norms. But our analysis thus far has demonstrated both the advantages and potential costs of rewarding directors.
Drawing on this analytical framework, this Part offers preliminary sketches
of two alternative reward regimes that just might work. Although narrower
than reverse negligence, both regimes share its core features: they dispense
generous, high-impact rewards for exemplary behavior after a review of director conduct that follows the occurrence of certain "triggering events."
While we believe that the regimes we describe are workable, we nonetheless
acknowledge that they require further study and discussion. This Part does
not purport to offer a complete list of reward regimes. Rather, our goal is to
encourage future attempts to devise novel proposals for director reward
schemes.
A. The Resignation Rule
The reverse negligence rule does not specify what a director must do to
earn a reward. As we explained earlier, this indeterminacy might discourage
directors from filing reward claims. The first regime that we proposewhich we term the "resignation rule"-addresses this shortcoming by specifying what directors need to do to be eligible for a reward."0 It also targets
an important institutional disincentive to vigorous monitoring: the risk that
an active and concerned director might be sidelined on the board and
hounded into resigning.
The resignation rule would reward directors who lose their board seats
in the line of duty. A director would become eligible for a reward under this
rule when she filed a letter with the board: (1) announcing her immediate
resignation; (2) detailing her suspicions about an incipient crisis or hidden
company misconduct; (3) identifying facts that gave rise to her suspicions;
and (4) describing her efforts to prompt action or investigation, which had
either failed to move the board's majority or excited management's antagonism. If subsequent events vindicated the withdrawing director's suspicions,

110. The resignation rule is more akin to a regulatory regime than a liability regime. For a
comprehensive review of the relevant considerations for choosing between liability and regulation,
see Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
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she would become eligible to receive a generous fixed reward."' To collect,
the resigning director would merely submit her application and "exit letter"
to the administrating authority, which might be a court (as under the reverse
negligence rule) or the board itself (as we discuss in the next Section). If the
director's suspicions prove to have been well founded, the company or its
insurer would be forced to pay the reward unless it could be shown that the
claimant had failed to communicate her suspicions before resigning, or that
the board had immediately initiated action that should have made her resignation unnecessary. It may seem paradoxical that only failed gatekeeping
efforts would be rewarded under this proposal, but it is not. Directors will
presumably monitor more vigorously if they are protected from the financial
and reputational costs of retaliation by a recalcitrant management.'2
A difficult point in the application of the resignation rule, however, concerns the director who does not resign but is forced to depart because the
company drops her name from the proxy as a candidate for reelection. A
director might be excluded from the proxy for two reasons. On the one
hand, management's allies on the board's nominating committee might be
retaliating against an aggressive monitor. On the other hand, a director
might be dropped for incompetence or disruptiveness. Ideally, directors who
were excluded for the former reason should be eligible for rewards while
directors who were excluded for the latter reason should be discouraged
from filing an exit letter. However, given the practical difficulty of distinguishing between the two reasons for exclusion, our tentative inclination is
to exclude "non-nominations" from the resignation rule, and limit rewards
to directors who in fact resign. Doing this ensures that a director pays for
the option of seeking a reward with her board seat, which makes the claim
that she
had fruitlessly sought to perform her monitoring duties more credi3
ble."1
The resignation rule offers both weaknesses and strengths. Its principal
strength is that it clearly marks the path that directors must follow in order
to earn rewards. The rule thus reduces uncertainty for directors ex ante and
imposes few burdens ex post on reward administrators, who need only examine exit letters in light of subsequent events. Nevertheless, predictability
comes at a cost. The resignation rule is unhelpful when, for example, a diIll.

On the considerations bearing on the magnitude of rewards, see supra Section IV.C.

112. The SEC requires pubic companies to disclose promptly directors' departure, describe
the disagreement triggering the departure, and file as an exhibit any written correspondence. See
SEC, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 14-16 (requiring the disclosure of the departure of directors in
Item 5.02), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. Disclosing the content of the
exit letter immediately upon a director's resignation might discourage directors from truthfully
listing their concerns and suspicions and would presumably undermine the effectiveness of the
resignation rule. Thus, implementing the proposed rule might require the SEC to exempt the letter
from the disclosure requirement.
113. The resignation requirement mitigates the collective action problem characterizing
boards. without the resignation requirement, directors who happen to leave the board for whatever
reasons could deposit confidential letters without taking any further action. Under the proposed rule,
only the director who resigns will be entitled to a reward. Directors thus cannot free ride the vigilance efforts of their colleagues without personally incurring the cost of leaving the board.
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rector discovers misconduct and remains on the board to participate in its
rectification. Indeed, this rule might encourage some outside directors to
resign prematurely. But the resignation rule is not meant to be a comprehensive device for motivating director oversight. Rather, it is designed to rectify
a single failing of the existing market for directors: management's de facto
influence over the tenure of directors.
Moreover, if its objectives are limited,
4
so are its likely political costs."
B. A Board-AdministeredRegime: Rewarding Leadership
Our second proposal, which we term a "leadership regime," requires
very little legal intervention. It would authorize boards themselves to reward
directors who exercised extraordinary initiative in times of company crisis.
The justification for this would be similar to the rationale for rewarding departing directors under the resignation rule: pursuing difficult issues and
persistently asking tough questions in the face of management indifference
or hostility goes well beyond what most directors expect to do when they
join their boards. " ' Directors who make this extra effort and who spark major corporate changes as a result deserve the special recognition of
shareholders.
Companies would opt into the leadership regime by means of a charter
provision requiring boards to consider whether to reward directors who had
exercised exemplary initiative. The board's duty-and authority-to make
leadership awards would arise after the occurrence of a triggering event,
such as an involuntary departure of the company's CEO,"1 6 a major financial
restatement, or an SEC investigation. The precise set of triggering events
would be identified in each company's charter. In the best of worlds, moreover, the law would expressly provide for company charters to authorize
leadership awards, much as Delaware law now blesses charter provisions
that relieve directors of monetary liability for breach of the duty of care.1'7
But the law's imprimatur would not be essential; including this regime in a
respected code of best practices might be enough. Even without legislative
change, state law presently allows corporations to adopt the charter provisions necessary for establishing the leadership regime.

114. The resignation rule offers an ancillary enforcement benefit: an exit letter puts the board
on notice of possible wrongdoing, and thus makes it more likely that directors who do not resign
will face personal liability for neglecting their gatekeeping duties, even under the weak, knowledgebased liability regime that prevails today.
115. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1985, at 83, 103-04; Langevoort, supra note 105, at 797 ("The work of the board prizes consensus,
not conflict.").
116. The company can define in advance the circumstances under which the CEO's resignation would qualify as an involuntary departure for our purposes. For example, the company can
determine that a resignation in conjunction with events such as a restatement or the opening of an
SEC investigation would be considered an involuntary departure.
117.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).

1706

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1677

Because the board would make leadership awards, it would be important
to limit the number of eligible directors to one or two per triggering event.
The award, after all, is meant to recognize individual initiative relative to the
behavior of other board members; it is not intended to allow the entire board
to give itself a bonus for a job well done, as this would undercut the function
of the award as well as its political credibility. The number of recipients per
period should be limited explicitly, in the company's charter, and also implicitly, by setting a high threshold for eligibility. In particular, leadership
awards should not be granted to directors who were merely non-negligent in
supervising management, but only to those who took the initiative and performed a leading role in sparking corporate change." '
The considerations bearing on magnitude would be similar to those we
discussed earlier," 9 with the exception that directors would not be expected
to initiate reward claims. Furthermore, if boards rather than courts administered leadership awards, there would be more room to adjust their
magnitude to the particular characteristics of a director's actions. Whatever
the size of a leadership award, moreover, the corporation itself would presumably have to pay it, since the board could not both select the recipients
and expect an insurer to foot the bill. For small firms, this might mean that
the board should make provision ex ante to assure the availability of funds
for a reward even if the company were to become insolvent.
The real question with respect to the leadership regime is: why should it
work at all? Why should the same institution that initially greets the prodding of an activist director with indifference or even hostility later become
capable of assessing her eligibility for an award? Or, since we talk of incentives here, why would an activist director who faces initial resistance later
expect the board to gratefully recognize her efforts to the tune of a million
dollars or more?
The answer has several parts. To begin, boards are better positioned than
courts to acquire the information necessary for evaluating director conduct,
especially when the inquiry focuses on quite elusive actions, such as sparking a corporate change. 2 If one or two directors mobilize their colleagues
by exposing wrongdoing that results in a material change in corporate governance-say, a displacement of the CEO or a restatement of the
financials-the importance of the contribution that these directors have
made to the firm's governance will be obvious to everyone on the board,
including the remaining directors and the new CEO. 121

118. Such limitations should virtually eliminate any concern that the triggering-event requirement would perversely affect boards. See supra Section IVA.
119.

See supra Section IVD.

120. For a review of recent action by boards to oust CEOs, see Alexei Barrionuevo, The Rise
of the Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at C1 (reporting board action leading to the departure of
CEOs at Disney, Hewlett-Packard, Boeing, and other companies).
121. Leaving courts out of the picture also makes this regime far less dependent on political
support, which would be difficult to obtain given the considerations we discussed in Section I.E.
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The question is whether boards could be relied upon to deny payments
to those who do not deserve them (the collusion problem) and to make payments to those who do (the retaliation problem). One important check on the
quality of the board's decision-making is the fact that the corporate crises
we suggest as triggering events-major financial restatements or involuntary
terminations of CEOs-are typically accompanied by a change in the management team and major turnover on the board. The board after a crisis is
unlikely to be the same as the board that presided before it."'2 In addition,
companies could adopt mechanisms that would alleviate collusion concerns.
For example, a special committee of new or disinterested directors might be
charged with making awards. The board could also commit to obtaining
shareholder approval of such awards. Finally, press coverage and intra-board
rivalries would make it difficult to reward a single continuing director without good reasons to do so.
The need for a fresh start in the wake of a regime change or major financial restatement is also the best guarantee that continuing directors will not
retaliate against the activist director who uncovered wrongdoing or pressed
for new management. Under the leadership regime, we would not permit
lawsuits to compel boards to pay out awards, as this would implicate legislative intervention and judicial participation that are contrary to the self-help
character of this regime. Instead we would rely on the reputational value to
the company of celebrating its honest and persistent directors, particularly
when these directors remain on the board. In addition, if a new management
team assumes control of the company in the wake of a crisis, as frequently
happens, these managers will have every reason to feel grateful toward the
directors who sparked the fall of the old regime.
Like the resignation rule considered in the previous Section, the leadership regime is underinclusive. It is unlikely, for example, to provide
incentives for directors to perform routine oversight tasks such as the hard
work of the audit committee and particularly of its chair. The leadership
regime is also less precise in terms of the conduct it reaches. Directors
would have a difficult time predicting ex ante how to qualify for this reward.
On the other hand, the fact that a company recognizes the possibility that
individual initiative on the board may pay large dividends to the company
and its shareholders will have an important incentive effect. The fact that the
leadership award is wholly voluntary and requires almost no government
involvement also increases its political attractiveness. If the costs are low
enough, there is every reason to adopt a reward regime even if we believe
that its determinations will be noisy and its error rate high.

122. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Farrell & David E. Whidbee, The Consequences of Forced CEO
Succession for Outside Directors, 73 J. Bus. 597 (2000) (finding increased likelihood of outside
director turnover following forced CEO succession). But see Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani,
Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth, J. FIN. EcON. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=687412 (finding no evidence of
abnormal turnover of outside directors on the boards of firms facing shareholder lawsuits).
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C. Extensions

We have outlined two tentative regimes that may translate the advantageous features of rewards into a workable arrangement. While they differ on
many aspects, both regimes seek to encourage outside directors to demonstrate initiative, leadership, and willingness to challenge management when
necessary-precisely the type of conduct that equity pay and court-imposed
sanctions are inherently incapable of producing. This menu of reward regimes, however, is by no means complete. The benefits of rewards may be
achieved by other innovative rules designed to implement the core features
we have identified-substituting rewards for sanctions and relying on ex
post evaluation of director conduct.
Our analysis assumed that rewards should be granted to individual directors based on an assessment of their performance. But rewards could be
employed in some group settings as well. Collective rewards may be useful
when there is a need to encourage members of a board's committee to act as
a group rather than demonstrate individual leadership, or when identifying
the contribution of each member is difficult. Consider, for example, a rule
that would reward all members of the audit committee for making the company restate its financials. This would enhance the incentives of committee
members to uncover problems with the company's financial statements
without requiring fact-finders to enter the thicket of determining which
members of the committee outperformed their peers in investigating red
flags in the company's financial disclosure.
Furthermore, institutional investors could become more active in devising innovative reward regimes, encouraging companies to opt into such
regimes, 23 and perhaps even administering rewards. Institutional investors
make considerable investments in various corporate governance matters
with respect to both specific companies and overall market issues. They are
thus positioned to develop a mechanism for rewarding directors who demonstrated exceptional leadership during corporate crises. Institutional
investors are also positioned to evaluate directors' conduct and offer rewards
to directors who demonstrated exceptional vigilance. Such a regime would
have several attractive features: it provides a viable source of funding that is
less susceptible to collusion; it does not require directors to initiate reward
claims; and paying directors by a third party is less likely to raise objections.
CONCLUSION

The preceding Part addressed a family of reward regimes loosely based
on the principle of reverse negligence as a means of motivating corporate
directors. As outlined above, regimes of this sort would reward directors for
diligent monitoring during certain identifiable periods-generally speaking,
periods of harm to the firm or managerial misconduct. At first glance, these

123. Institutional investors currently encourage companies to include equity pay in the compensation arrangements of outside directors. Yermack, supra note 15, at 2282.
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regimes might seem to reward directors for bad outcomes. In fact, however,
the association of rewards with bad outcomes is merely a matter of administrative economy. The true effect of these regimes is to induce outside
directors to monitor most closely during precisely those periods when their
vigilance is most needed-that is, when management is misbehaving. The
likely result would be the deterrence of some misconduct (as managers desist from misbehaving for fear of being discovered), and the interruption of
other wrongdoing midstream (as directors discover ongoing wrongdoing).
To be sure, a negligence-based liability regime could create the same incentives as the reward regimes we describe. But liability poses obstacles to
recruiting top-caliber directors and pressures boards toward risk-averse
decision-making. Thus, expanding directorial liability would be not only far
more costly than offering rewards, but also infeasible on political grounds.
Over the years, the law has woven a cocoon of liability insulation around the
director's oversight role, and this is unlikely to change any time soon. If
legal reform is needed, a reward regime---of the reverse negligence typemay be the only practicable alternative.'24
This Article focuses on outside directors. But would rewards outperform
liability with respect to other kinds of gatekeepers as well?"s A full answer
is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, we would like to generalize about the qualities that might make a gatekeeper's role suitable for a
reward regime by briefly returning to the characteristics that make outside
directors attractive candidates for rewards. There are, by our count, at least
four of these characteristics.
The first is the "lumpiness" of the directors' services and the magnitude
of the harm that they can prevent relative to the size of their own assets. Directors are individuals-not organizations 2 who sit on a small numbers of
boards for long periods of time. Conventional wisdom suggests that most
directors are wealthy executives for whom directors' fees are small relative
to personal assets, and therefore not strong motivators. But even if directors
expect "large" compensation relative to their assets, the possible liability
they would face (relative to their assets) under a negligence regime is still
larger. As we have argued, this catastrophic liability risk, which cannot be
fully insured if it is to provide meaningful monitoring incentives, produces
recruitment difficulties and distorted decision-making.
Second, as we note above, directors have two functions: they are both
managers' monitors and advisers in business decision-making. Personal liability, which arguably enhances the director's monitoring performance,
simultaneously distorts her performance as an advisor and architect of

124. The other alternative-which lawmakers currently follow-is regulating board functions
and structure. See Fairfax, supra note 53, at 400-05.
125. We assume that rewards lose their appeal with respect to primary wrongdoers, at least
with respect to intentional misconduct.
126. In some jurisdictions, organizations qualify to serve as directors. The possibility of "entity" directors raises additional gatekeeper alternatives that parallel those we discuss below in the
context of accountants.
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corporate policy. In theory, paying rewards only in the aftermath of certain
harmful events also would distort the director's performance by motivating
her to select risky ventures for the company. Rewards, however, are less
likely to degrade directorial advice because directors have neither the
power-given their limited responsibility for initiating projects-nor the
inclination-given the severe market and legal consequences that follow
misconduct-to urge overly risky business strategies. Put differently, by
virtue of their organizational roles, directors are asymmetrically susceptible
to distorted decision-making on the side of excess caution rather than risk-

taking.
A third characteristic that makes directors well-suited to a reward regime
is the fact that they act collectively in a small group rather than individually.
Monitoring by groups is inevitably subject to free riding and other collective
action problems. Even if all directors faced equal liability costs for failing to
challenge a problematic course of action pressed by the CEO, each director
might refrain from making a challenge-assuming a challenge would risk
costly retaliation-in the hope that another director would step up to the
plate. This problem is exacerbated by the pressure on directors to settle
shareholder lawsuits, thereby preventing courts from scrutinizing the performance of individual directors. By contrast, individualized compensation
under a reward regime would overcome this collective action problem.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the difficulty of describing ex
ante precisely what a director must do in fast-moving business circumstances makes directors particularly suitable candidates for a reward regime.
Uncertainty as to the precise content of a director's duty under a negligence
rule leads to a high risk of error, which in its turn aggravates the secondary
liability costs of recruitment and distorted decision-making. By contrast,
even if it left error rates unchanged, a reward regime would eliminate liability costs associated with recruitment and reduce the costs of distorted
decision-making. Moreover, because the prospect of rewards will motivate
directors to reveal rather than conceal information about their own behavior,
a reward regime is likely to lead to more informed evaluations of directorial
conduct and, therefore, fewer errors.
The importance of these four elements of the outside director's role in
favoring reward-based incentives over liability can be gleaned from the fact
that at least one class of participants in corporate governance-auditorshave long been held liable under a negligence regime for monitoring failures. Auditors stand at the opposite end of the spectrum from directors on all
four characteristics that recommend a reverse negligence regime. The auditors of public companies are large firms rather than individuals, with deep
pockets and diversified professional relations that extend to hundreds or
even thousands of clients."' Outside auditors are gatekeepers pure and simple. Their sole function is to monitor the firm's financial statements; they are

127.

But see Floyd Norris, Will Big Four Audit Firms Survive in a World of Unlimited Liabil-

ity?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at CI (reporting the industry's concern that auditor liability would

cause audit firms to become insolvent).
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not involved in other aspects of the firm's decision-making. 28 In addition,
auditors qua organizations are unitary entities; they do not face conventional
collective action problems, even though-as the fate of Arthur Andersen in
the Enron debacle suggests-accounting firms can face severe agency problems." 9 Finally, auditors pursue a highly elaborate methodology that can be
described ex ante and evaluated ex post with far more precision than a director's duty of care. On all dimensions, then, liability under a negligence rule
makes far more sense for auditors than for outside directors. Correlatively, a
reward regime of the reverse negligence variety appears less appealing for
auditors. Without auditor liability, the risk of implicit collusion between
auditors in search of rewards and managers intent on misrepresentation
seems unacceptably large; with auditor liability, there is no need for a parallel reward regime.
This analysis tells us that auditors-in contrast to outside directors-are
poor candidates for a reverse negligence regime. It does not imply, however,
that the existing regime provides auditors with adequate incentives. Nor
does it answer the larger question of whether the law might improve auditor
incentives with a different sort of reward regime. Here the possibility of "reverse strict liability" comes to mind, or, alternatively, of a regime that would
allocate rewards on an aggregate basis, according to a normalized measure
of financial restatements among all of an auditor's clients. We list these possibilities not because we endorse them, but because they demonstrate that
augmenting the traditional liability regimes with a full set of possible legal
sanctions, both negative and positive, can provide potentially valuable tools
for fixing the incentives of gatekeepers that have not yet been analyzed-or
even imagined.

128. In fact, lawmakers impose various restrictions on auditors' ability to provide their clients
with non-audit services. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1533-37 (2005). Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)), introduced a requirement that auditors attest to managerial
assessments of internal controls and report their conclusions publicly. On the implications of this
new internal control audit requirement, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, FacilitatingAuditing's New
Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
1449 (2004).
129. See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification,
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167 (2003).
130. The proper scope of auditor liability is indeed controversial. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV.
301, 349-53 (2004) (offering a new regime of auditor liability); Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform:
Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39 (2002) (advocating a regime of financial statement insurance that would replace the existing audit system).
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